时 间：2024年4月18日 12：30-14：00 （周四）
地 点：明德主楼729
主讲人：周臻 清华大学五道口金融学院副教授
主持人：崔志伟 中国人民大学经济学院副教授
主 题：biased wisdom from the crowd
■ 讲座简介：
this paper studies information aggregation through the strategic behavior of privately informed agents under crowdfunding. in crowdfunding campaigns, agents pay a fixed contribution and receive a common return conditional on the project attracting sufficient investment. therefore, an investment pledge is consequential only if the total investment exceeds the funding threshold. this consequentiality condition allows agents to benefit from the wisdom of others. in equilibrium, agents discount their individual wisdom and may invest despite their private information suggesting otherwise. such individual choices are privately optimal but socially inefficient. information aggregation does, however, have a distinctive bias: crowdfunding is more effective at endorsing desirable projects than screening out undesirable ones. even as crowd size grows indefinitely, the false-positive error persists, while the false-negative error approaches zero. we further distinguish crowdfunding from voting and coordination games by comparing consequentiality with pivotality and regime-change conditions, and extend our model to account for private valuations, fixed funding goals, subscription costs, donations, and dynamic learning.
■ 主讲人简介：
周臻博士现任清华大学五道口金融学院副教授，博士生导师，清华大学五道口金融学院货币政策与金融稳定研究中心副主任。他于2016年毕业于纽约大学，取得经济学博士学位。在此之前，他获得了清华大学的经济学硕士学位和复旦大学经济学学士学位。
周臻现阶段的主要研究领域是信息经济学的理论研究以及其在金融中介与银行监管、公司金融、宏观经济等领域的运用。他在 american economic review，journal of economic theory，games and economic behavior 等一流学术期刊上发表过多篇论文。