中国人民大学经济学院-亚博安卓下载

[宏观经济学研讨会]constrained discretion and central bank transparency
发文时间:2017-11-21

     【econ20171219】  
      宏观经济学研讨会          (总第234期)      
【时间】2017年11月22日(周三)12:15-13:45  
【地点】明商0202教室  
【主讲】周璇 中国人民大学经济学院助理教授  
【主题】 constrained discretion and central bank transparency(f. bianchi & l. melosi, frb of chicago working paper, 2016)  
【摘要】we develop and estimate a general equilibrium model in which monetary policy can deviate from active inflation stabilization and agents face uncertainty about the nature of these deviations. when observing a deviation, agents conduct bayesian learning to infer its likely duration. under constrained discretion, only short deviations occur: agents are confident about a prompt return to the active regime, macroeconomic uncertainty is low, welfare is high. however, if a deviation persists, agents’ beliefs start drifting, uncertainty accelerates, and welfare declines. if the duration of the deviations is announced, uncertainty follows a reverse path. for the u.s. transparency lowers uncertainty and increases welfare.  
【主持】陈彦斌 教授  
 
 
    人大宏观经济学研讨会(macro workshop)旨在追踪宏观经济学国际最新进展,倡导构建符合国情的动态优化模型,并使用计算机模拟研究经济增长、收入分配和宏观政策等中国宏观经济重大问题。  
联系人:刘哲希    email:macro_workshop@163.com  
资料下载:www.docin.com/mydoc-88265459-1.html  
更多讲座信息请访问:econ.ruc.edu.cn,www.yanjiuyuan.com.cn。  
   
   
      中国人民大学经济学院          中国经济改革与发展研究院      

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