内容摘要
we consider a model where players can actively form a limited number of links with other players to play a general class of size-dependent coordination games. this class of games includes multi-person binary action coordination games, minimum effort games, average opinion games, and others, and it is mainly characterized by strategic complementarities among actions. whenever players may only support links to a relatively small number of other players, the most efficient convention will be selected, irrespective of the details of the size-dependent coordination games. when the linking constraint becomes less restrictive, the most efficient convention will still be selected, provided that the most efficient action delivers a relatively high output when played against a small group also using it. furthermore, for the special case of size-dependent minimum effort games, the second most efficient convention may be selected.
作者简介
崔志伟，中国人民大学经济学院副教授，曾在埃塞克斯大学经济系（department of economics, the university of essex）进行访问研究。研究兴趣为网络博弈理论及应用、博弈学习理论及应用、行为经济学理论、微观经济理论。主持完成/在研国家自然科学基金项目三项，在journal of economic theory、games and economic behavior、journal of economic behavior and organization、journal of economic dynamics and control、journal of mathematical economics等国际主流经济学期刊发表论文十余篇。相关研究成果被david levine（econometrica前联合主编、专著《the theory of learning in games》共同作者）、carlos alós-ferrer（journal of economic psychology 联合主编）、william h. (bill) sandholm（jet、te、geb前副主编、专著《population games and evolutionary dynamics》作者）等所引用或跟踪拓展。